Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Hong Kong Institute of Business Studies
Working Paper Series

Hong Kong Institute of Business Studies 香港商
學研究所

12-1996

The motives of Hong Kong-Japanese international joint ventures
Mei Ling, May WONG
Lingnan University, Hong Kong, wongml@ln.edu.hk

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/hkibswp
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Wong, M. M. L. (1996). The motives of Hong Kong-Japanese international joint ventures (HKIBS Working
Paper Series 005-967). Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/hkibswp/78

This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Hong Kong Institute of Business Studies 香港商
學研究所 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hong Kong Institute of
Business Studies Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

HONG KONG INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS STUDIES
港

學

商

所

究

研

vVOR'k lNG PAPER SERIES
研 、 3足報告

「「 一

The Motives of
Hong Kong - Japanese
International Joint Ventures

MayML WONG
Department 0/ Management
Lingnan College

LIN üNAN
,

CυLLEüE

B
飽

弋t-

~ U

S l' N

E

S S

WORKING PAPER SERIES

研

5之報告

@
Disclaimer
The responsibility for facts , languages and opinions expressed in this publication rests
exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily rejlect the
views or the policy of the Hong Kong Jnstitute of Business Studies and the Faculty of
Business.

}{KIBS/~PS/005-967

December 1996

The Motives of
Hong Kong - Japanese
International Joint Ventures

MayML WONG
Department 01 Management
Lingnan College

Hong Kong Institute of Business Studies
Lingnan College
Tuen Mun
New Territories
Tel: (852) 2616 8373
Fax: (852) 2572 4171

The Motives ofHong Kong-Japanese International Joint Ventures
Abstract
This paper attempts to study Hong Kong-Japanese joint ventures
from the perspectives of firm-specific advantages provided by
both partners.

The analysis focuses on the local partner' s

perspective of establishing international joint ventures (I JV s)
with a J apanese multinational retailer. First , the background of
the local

pa吋 ner，

especially the company' s organisational

restructuring immediately before the formation of the INs is
examined . Second , the development and consolidation of the
IJV s between the two partners by a series of IN activities in
Hong Kong , Asia, and China is described.

Third , the motives

behind both partners to establish the IJV s are examined. Finally,
an evaluation of the IJV s of whether the IJV s have fulfilled the
local partner' s motives is conducted. It is found that the IJV s
have provided an opportunity for the local partner to overcome
the increasing J apanese competition in the Hong Kong retail
sector since the mid-1980s.

Nevertheless , the local partner

needs to overcome many management problems resu1ted from
the IJV s partnership which may have hindered the local
to achieve its objectives in the IJV s.

pa吋 ner

Introduction

Aft er the yen appreciation in 1985 , there was a sudden surge of Japanese investment in

Hong Kong. Am ong the Japanese investors, Japanese retailers were one of the most
aggressive investors in the latter half of 1980s. Therefore , locally-owned department stores
had come under increasing pressure from Japanese competition. ln recent years , as the local
retail market has become saturated , some of these local stores started to look for a more
lucrative market in China. However, some local retailers such as Wing On had learnt a tough
lesson in 1949 when the Communist Chinese Government took over her properties in China,
which made her hesitant to invest in China again , especially after the Tienanman Square
lncident in 1989. Under the internal and external pressure, Wing On managed to resolve this
problem and increased her competitiveness by entering into international joint ventures with a
Japanese multinational retail giant , the Seiyu Ltd

Objectives of This Study

The objectives of this study is to find out why Wing On entered into the IN s with
Seiyu and how the IJVs impacted on Wing On's performance in the retail business. Al most all
the existing studies in international joint ventures (I JV s) focus on the study of the foreign
pa此ners ，

however , this study focuses on the study of the local partner, Wing On. Under what

situations were Wing On and Seiyu motivated to team up with each other? Aft er more than
six years' teaming up with Seiyu , has Wing On managed to achieve what it originally expected
from the IJV s?

Have the IJV s changed Wing On' s corporate strategy and performance?

These issues are examined in the following

Methodology

This research used a case-study approach based primarily on intensive interviews with
the executives and managers involved in the IJV s supplemented by secondary data - annual
repo 此 s ，

company reports , in-company staff magazine and newspaper clippings of both
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companies. The author had access to the informants of both companies as a resu 1t of her past
working experience in Seiyu immediately before and during the formation of the IN s.

Background of Wing On

In 1907 , Wing On Company Ltd. (WOC) was incorporated to operate department
store and warehouse business. Aft er losing all her properties to the People' s Republic of
China in 1949 , the company changed her business policy in Hong Kong. Wing On abandoned
to operate her major business in the textile industry and kept the department store business
which is still considered as an important portion of business. Furthermore , she diversified into
finance and insurance business which can be liquidated easily and quickly (Chai , 1981 , p.145)
In order to diversify her business , Wing On set up Wing On (Holdings) Ltd. (WOH) and the
WOC became a subsidiary of WOH in 1979. WOH became the parent company of the Wing
On Group .

Internal Re-organisation of \Ving On

In February 1989 , Wing On re-organised her business by transferring the department
store busÍness in WOC to a new Ínvestment vehicle incorporated in Bermuda called Wing On
Department Stores (Bermuda) Ltd. (WODSB) . WODSB was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
WOC and became the holding company for the Group' s department store operations. The
Wing On Department Stores Ltd. was renamed as Wing On Department Stores (Hong Kong)
Ltd.

(而rODSHK) ，

a wholly owned subsidiary of WODSB.

This Ínternal re-organisation

involved the transfer of inventories , furniture , fittings and the department store properties:
Wing On Plaza and a go-down in Kowloon Bay to WODSHK. According to Russell Kwok
Chi-yan , director and general manager of WODS , the reason for this re-organisation was "to
facilitate future expansion of the department store operations in Southeast Asia, North
Am erica and Australia . . . [since] the Bermuda-based company would be financially

independent and its performance could be assessed separately so as to facilitate its future
overseas expansion" (Ko , 1989)
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In October 1991 , Wing On (Holdings) Ltd. and Wing On Company Ltd. also redomiciled to Bermuda and became Wing On Intemational Holdings Ltd. (WOIH) and Wing
On Company International Ltd. (WOCI). WOIH became the new parent company of the
Group (see the organisational structure , figure 1). According to Wardley Data (1991) the
reason for the re-organisation was:
in view of the increasingly international nature of the group' s assets and the
significant proportion of the Company's share capital held by overseas shareholders ,
the Directors consider that it would be beneficial to establish a new overseas holding
company for the Group. This will provide the Group with greater flexibility to
structure international investments.

Figure 1: Organisational Structure of Wing On' s Retail-related Business

Wing On International Holdings Lt d

[jormer Wing On (Holdings) Ltd before 1991}
[80D: 7 Kwoks & 3 Seiyu exec lI tives]
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International Joint Ventures Between Wing On and Seiyu

The reason for Wing On' s internal re-organisation was “ unveiled six month later [in
August 1989] as the manoeuvre was the first step for Seiyu to take a 40% stake in Wing On
Department Stores . . ." (Anonymous, 1990b , p.95). Aft er the initial step of Wing On teaming
up with Seiyu , both partners carried out a series of IJV activities in Hong Kong , Asia and
China to consolidate the IJV s.

InHong Kong

According to Root (1987 , p .4 6) joint ventures can be formed by foreign partner' s
acquisition of a partial ownership interest in the existing local company. The initial entry mode
of IJV s between Wing On and Seiyu took this form. Both companies signed the joint venture
contract on September 18 , 1989. Wing On Company Ltd sold 40 percent of her whollyowned subsidiary, Wing On Department Stores (Bermuda) Ltd. to Seiyu for a cash price of
HK$356 million. The IJVs between Wing On and Seiyu developed furthe r. In February 1990,
Wing On Company Ltd. entered into another joint venture with Seiyu to operate a new
department store in Shatin under the name of Seiyu (Shatin) Department Store. However,
instead of acquiring interest from Wing On, Seiyu sold 40 percent interest of the Shatin
operation to WOC by HK$12 million
These two partners opened a number of new store outlets. In 1990 , they replaced the
previous Mongkok store by a new and larger store, and opened a new store in Tsuen Wan. In
1991 , they opened two more store outlets in Whampoa Garden and Hunghom , and renovated
the main store in Sheung Wan. In 1992 , they opened their twelfth store outlet in Aberdeen.
In 1993 , they redeveloped the Yaumatei store

('九Tardley

Data, 1993). The redevelopment of

the Yaumatei store was completed in 1996

In Asia

Apart from their co-operation in Hong Kong , Wing On and Seiyu established links in
Southeast Asia. In 1990 , Joel Kwok Chi-ho , the executive director of Wing On Department
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Stores disclosed that the two companies would entered into further IJV s which was disclosed
in August 1991.

Russell K wok Chi-yan, director and general manager of Wing On

Department Store, announced that Wing On had teamed up with Seiyu to form an Asian
Retailer Affi liation Network (AR必J)l with nine retailers in the Asia Pacific region (Lai 1990)
Russell K wok stated that “ through collective purchase of merchandise , the competitiveness of
the nine ARAN members is increased through broadening their purchase sources and lowering
the unit merchandising costs. Furthermore, exchange of views in store design and opening
new store ou t1 ets jointly may be possible

in 臼ture"

(Anonymous , 1991 b) . Their first

AR創

project was in Singapore's Bugis Junction. Wing On and Seiyu opened a 25,000 sq. ft. store
in the Bugis Junction in mid-1995 (Lee , 1992)
Three months after the team up of ARAN, Wing On entered another joint venture with
Seiyu in November 199 1.

They formed a joint-venture company called Mujirushi Ryohin

Bermuda Ltd. under the Ryohin Keikaku Co ., Ltd. , a subsidiary of Seiyu (see figure 1). This
joint-venture company was 80 percent owned by Wing On and 20 percent by Ryohin Keikaku.
According to Sito (1991) “ this move is in line with Wing

0的 strategy

to expand her retail

business in Asia with Seiyu ." It was reiterated by the Chairman of Wing On, Angela Chan
(Annual

Repo代 1992 ，

p.6) :

The agreement is to carry on in Asia (other than J apan) a j oint venture business to
distribute and sell goods and operate stores and ou t1 ets under the brand name :
Mujirushi Ryohin

We consider that Mujirushi Ryohin has considerable potential for

successful expansion throughout Asia. In November 1992 they opened the first
store in the Ocean Centre , Hong Kong . It is followed by the

second 孔1uji

M叮 i

store opened

in Seibu Department Store, Pacific Place in April 1992.

In China

Aft er the IJV s with Seiyu had been consolidated in 1992 , Wing On Company

International decided to return to China after some 40 years. WOCI set up a shelf company,

The nine retailers in ARAN are: Wing On Group (Hong Kong) , Seiyu (Japan) , Family Mart (a subsidiary of
Seiyu in Japan) , Panvest Group (Taiwan) , C P Group (Thailand) , Lion Group (M alaysia) , Hero Group,
Pasaraya Group (I ndonesia) and Gem of Hawaii (U SA) [Annual Report , 1992b, p.5]
1
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Am ma to enter into a joint venture with another company, China Development Inc. by taking a

25 percent stake in the company. Under this joint venture , Wing On invested in China again
by forming the Wing On Department Store in Wuhan.

The Motives of the International Joint Ventures

Wing On and Seiyu were competitors in the retail industry. Why did they team up to
form the IJV s? In search of a joint venture partner, each company has different rationale to
enter into IJV s which may dictate the process of finding a partne r. Wing On has the following
motives which have governed her to choose Seiyu as a foreign

的ng

pa此ner.

On's Motives in the IJVs

In explaining the rationales for joint ventures , Brown, Rugman and Verbeke (1 988 ,
p.227) stated that "joint ventures are preferred if the two partners possess firm-specific
advantages (FSAs)2 which complement each othe r.

Only if the FSAs of the partners are

compatible will that co-operation lead to additional cost-reducing or differentiation-enhancing
potentia1." Seiyu's FSAs which had attracted and complemented Wing On to enter the INs
include the following motives.

Retail technologv and know-how

When Wing On chose her joint venture partners , she considered Seiyuls established
position in Japan and know-how in product development and retail technology.

Local

department stores had become less competitive to the J apanese department stores since
J apanese retailers possessed more advanced marketing , promotion and merchandising
techniques. The management of Wing On understood that it would take considerably more
effort and cost to catch up with the level of retail technology achieved by the Japanese.
According to the announcement to employees through the company' s newsletter, the Voice of

The concept ofFSA refers to a company's proprietary know-how in terms ofunique skills that reduce costs or
differentiate products.

2
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Wing On (1989) , one of Wing On's motives to enter into the IJVs with Seiyu was Seiyu's
strength in retail innovation:

Up to February 1989 , Seiyu has been operating 258 retail outlets in Japan.

They

3

incl ude department stores , general merchandising stores , supermarket chain stores
and convenience stores. Seiyu holds a strong market position in Japan by its streng
in new product development, and has set the trend of merchandising in Japan. The
company has developed many brand names and product concepts such as the

Mujirushi Ryohin (N o-name Brand) , Shoko-no-sachi (Food Abundance) , Sh 可u-no-me
(Housewife' s Eye) , N -10 Series , Colour Box and

Furusato λleihin

(Hometown

Favourites) . . . Therefore , the INs with Seiyu will enhance Wing On's know-how in
the purchasing and management of merchandises. In addition , it will also help us to
expand our retail business in Southeast Asia.

By means of the IJV s, Wing On expected to acquire technical assistance directly from
Seiyu in the adoption ofretail technology. According to Russell Kwok , this factor was one of
the most important considerations for the IJV s:

In the traditional operation practice of department store business , we do not have
supermarket or fast food section. Thus we lack the know-how to operate these two
sections.

Nevertheless , because of the market demand , the operation of food and

supermarket sections have become profitable. We are considering to open the food
section in our department stores in future. It is convenient for us to learn from Seiyu
since \tve are IJV partners. Furthermore , we can learn the operational techniques in
supermarket and fast food sections directly from the joint venture operation in Seiyu
(Shatin) as well (personal communication , 1990).

In Japan , retail stores which sell merchandises of clothing , household and food from lower to medium prices
are c1 assified as general merchandising store. It differentiates from department store which sell the same range
of merchandise in a upper marke t.

3
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Risk

s口 read

An other important factor for Wing On to enter the IJV s with Seiyu was for spreading

ris k. Long before Wing On intended to revamp her China business , the Kwok family had been
approached by the Shanghai Municipal Council , an organ of Chinese government , in mid
1980s to buy back her former Shanghai department store which was turned into a state-run
Tenth Department Store (An onymous 1986 , p.3). Instead of buying it back, the Managing
Director ofWing On Investment (China) , David Kwok , only signed an agreement to renovate
the store (Mayerson, 1985). Wing On hesitated to get involved in China business because “ ln
1949 , we have lost all our properties in China. We do not intend to take the risk to invest in
China again" (personal communication with Russell Kwok , 1989). Since Wing On had a bad
experience in China before , she tried to minimise her risks in the investment in Hong Kong and
China. N evertheless , the China risk factor was great1y decreased by teaming up with Wing
On. The Personnel Director ofWODS , William WongRussell Kwok stated:

The joint venture with Seiyu has minimised our risks in losing our operations in Hong
Kong and China because Wing On Department Stores (Bermuda) Ltd. is no longer a
locally-owned but a foreign Japanese-owned company. 1 do not think our company
would be confiscated by the Chinese government again like what happened in 1949
because we are a foreign-owned company. Therefore , we have less risk to expand our
operation in Hong Kong after 1997 and expand our business in China (personal
communication, 1991)

Aft er minimising the China risk , WODSB started to invest in China by forming a joint

venture retail business in Wuhan in 1992. In 1993 , it opened the first joint venture children
specialty store in Wuhan. It was a drastic change in Wing On's corporate strategy since 1949.

Soeed of entrv in Southeast Asian market

An other FSA of Seiyu was that the IJV s helped to speed up Wing On' s entry in the

Southeast Asian markets. Wing On planned to invest in the international markets of the
United States , Australia and Southeast Asia. The expansion plan in Asian markets coincided
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with that of Seiyu because of the economic boom in the Asian countries. The Bugis project in
Singapore was their first IJV s project in Asia.

Since Seiyu had already had a majority of

interest in the Bugis project, Wing On could access the market of Singapore easily by opening
a department store jointly with Seiyu in 1995. According to
(Shatin),“we have

fi叫ler

M明ke，

the Chairman of Seiyu

planned to expand our stores in other Southeast Asian countries

such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and so on (personal communication, 1990)

Economies of scale

Wing On regarded that Seiyu could provide wider but cheaper sources of merchandises
in good quality and design since “ Seiyu has taken the product development as one of its major
areas of operation in international business" (Annual Report, 1992b). Wing On could benefit
from obtaining favourable purchase through economies of scale from the regional
organisation, ARAN.

The Executive Director of Corporate Planning and Controller, Joel

K wok, pointed out,“after WODS and Seiyu have succeeded in their planned expansion in
Southeast Asia, we expect WODS would have a more than 15 percent growth in sales
turnover in 1990 as a resu1t of the economies of scale from a bigger operation" (Lee, 1990)

Seiyu 's Motivates in the

l刀3

On the other hand , the FSAs of Wing On that had attracted Seiyu to enter into the
IJV s are as follows.

Access to prime locations and markets

Seiyu intended to expand its overseas store as one of its long-term international
business strategy.

According to the Chairman of the Seiyu Ltd., Seiji Tsutsumi,“Seiyu

considers Hong Kong as the centre of its investments in Asia outside Japan" (Cabatit , 1989)
Nevertheless , almost all major Japanese retailers had already invested in Hong Kong by the
latter half of 1980s. Seiyu was a late-comer and it became

di在icult

to set up stores in Hong

Kong as most of the prime locations had either been taken up by other Japanese and local
competitors or too expensive to lease and purchase in the overheated property market in Hong
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Kong.

Seiyu found that the access to these locations and markets could rely on the joint

venture with Wing On which had owned many prime retail locations in various part of Hong
Kong.

Speed of entrv

An other FSA was the availability

of Wing On' s long established business

infrastructure. Seiyu managed to move into Hong Kong market quickly because it could make
use of many facilities already available in WODS. For example, as pointed out by Managing
Director of Seiyu (Shatin) , Miyake:

We have little need to invest in peripheral business related to department store
operation in Hong Kong . We can make use of the services of insurance, banking ,
security and

prope此y

provided by our joint venture partner, WOH' s subsidiaries.

Furthermore, we can make use of the services of warehousing , transport and computer
and information system provided by WODSHK.

In other words , we have only

invested HK$18 million but can obtain all other related services (personal
communication, 1990)

Evaluation of the International J oint Ventures

Both

pa此ners

have expanded locally and internationally since the formation of IJV s. It

appears that both partners have benefited from the joint ventures. Nevertheless , strategic
success of the IJV s depends on a mix of factors. The performance of the IJV s are evaluated
from Wing On's perspectives ofwhether her motives in teaming up with Seiyu were achieved .

Status 0/ Wing On
According to Al len (1990) , the immediate effect of the IJVs was an increase in Wing
On' s net profit and thus an increase of rewards to its shareholders:
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Wing On Co. yesterday posted an impressive 4 1. 5 percent jump in profit from
HK$139.9 million to HK$192.2 million for the year to December 1989. The Kwok
family . . . celebrated its success by rewarding shareholders with a generous total
dividend of 40 cents a share, almost double its 1988 pay-out of 22 cents . . . The
balance sheet was boosted by an extraordinary gain of HK$170.1 million , compared
with only HK$12. 3 million the year before. It resu 1ted from the sale of a 40 percent
stake in its subsidiary, Wing On Department Stores , to the Japanese retail giant Seiyu.
Furthermore , the IJV s had greatly improved the financial hea1th of Wing On since she
had not only fully paid her debts but also had an account surplus that was the first time in
many years

(D 缸，

1990). Some financial analysts even stated that Wing On' s link with Seiyu

was considered as an aid to Wing On' s declining department store business.

Wing On

managed to maintain her interim result satisfactory in face of the strong J apanese competition
in the early 1990s (Ko , 1990). Aft er the first year's good results , Wing On's net profit and her
rewards to shareholders continued to increase:
Wing On

repo 口ed

a 38 percent jump in net profit yesterday for the year ended last

December. . . It recorded net profit of$260.88 million with $189 .4 3 million in 1989 . .
Turnover rose by 21 percent to $1.9 billion . . . Directors declared a final dividend of
30 cents a share, making a total pay-out of 45 cents (An onymous, 1991 a)
Compared with the other local department stores which were just surviving in the
J apanese competition , Wing On managed to open many new store outlets under the IJV s.
Thus , Wing On was considered as the most outstanding local department stores among the
retailers in Hong Kong.

The increase of profit, improved financial health and aggressive

expansion had enhanced Wing On' s status among the local retailers as Kirby (1991) stated ,
"Wing On is one of the last indigenous department store groups in the territory'\

Advancement in Retαil Technology

Wing On obtained considerable assistance from Seiyu in upgrading her retail operation.
According to a Japanese expatriate manager of Seiyu (Shatin) , Ms Tanaka, when Wing On
renovated the main store in 1992, a design team coming from Seiyu Japan assisted Wing On to
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renovate the main store by a J apanese-style store layout approach (personal communication,
1992). Furthermore, Russell Kwok pointed out,“ as a result of the INs with Seiyu , we can
learn the retail information technology from Seiyu. For example, we have jointly purchased
some modern cash register machines which can increase our company' s efficiency"

(An onymous , 1990a).

Basical1 y, Wing On has implemented electronic point-of-sales

technology which has improved the overal1 operational efficiency.

Changes in Wing

On 法 Corporate

Strategies as a Result of Risk Spread and Economies of
Scale

Aft er teaming up with Seiyu , Wing On had changed some of her corporate strategies.

First, Wing On' s investment in China signified a drastic change in her corporate strategy in
China' s marke t. The IJVs with Seiyu had greatly reduced the China risk in the PRC markets
which had been avoided for some forty years by the Kwok family. According to Mark Kwok,
corporate manager of Wing On Department Stores , the investment in the Wuhan store was not
smal1 since “ the venture's paid-up capital is just US$50 , OOO but some US$ 1. 2 rni l1 ion has
earmarked for renovation and equipment cost" (Ward , 1992). Angela Chan, the Chairman of
WOIH , stated ,“Wing On did not expect significant profit contribution from the PRC activities
in the short term. However , the company' s expansion of department store business into the
PRC formed a key part of Wing On' s development strategy and its long term prospects were
encouraging" (Annual Report , 1993)
Second , Wing On has re-organised internal1 y and set up a complicated network of
cross-shareholding among different subsidiaries of both
commercial dealings. The cross-shareholdings of the

pa口ner

pa此ners

with which they have

companles

suppo 此 a

subtle blend

of financial independence and commercial cooperation. Furthermore, it leads to less risk ,
sharing resources with the joint venture partner and lower tax. The joint ventures have an
immediate effect of turning Wing On into a profitable company. Shareholders become more
optimistic of Wing On' s business as a resu 1t of the team up of and the backup from Seiyu .
Wing On has become more international in terms of store and merchandise operation. She has
shown to the Hong Kong public that she wi l1 not transfer more capital out of Hong Kong but
wi l1 invest more in China as a resu 1t ofthe joint ventures.
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Furthermore, Wing On has changed its purchase and merchandising policies. Retail
specialists pointed out,“After joint venture with Seiyu, Wing On seems to have become more
In the past, Wing On mainly purchased European and

open in her business practices.

Am erican merchandises that are more expensive. Now , Wing On purchase mainly from the

Southeast Asian countries" (Anonymous , 1990b)

Control 0/ Joint Ventures

As a resu1t of the IJVs , three Japanese executives joined the Board of Directors of
Wing On International Holdings Ltd . The rest of the seven members were the Kwok family
('九Tardley

Data, 1993). Al though holding a minority interest in the joint ventures , Seiyu could

gain certain extent of control over the joint ventures. As Root (1987 , p.153) pointed out:

Minority

pa此ner

can also exercise control through bylaws that grant it certain rights ,

e.g. , the selection ofkey executives, management contract, issuance ofvoting and nonvoting stock shares . . . the minority interest may also be protected by holding veto
rights over key decisions in the joint venture , such as dividend declaration or new
capital investment.

Both

pa討ners

and Wing On over

had certain control in the decisions of each other - Seiyu over WODS

Sei卯 (Shatin)

which might help safeguard both

pa巾ers'

interest to a

certain extent. Both partners co-operated very well at the beginning. Karl Kwok stated,“We
believe the successful partnership of Wing On Department Stores group with Seiyu will assist
a profitable growth of our department store business in both Hong Kong and internationa11y"

(Annual Report 1990 , p.9)

Perforn1ance of the Joint Ventures and the Responses of 的ngOn'sManαgement

After two years of increased net profit as a resu1t of the joint venture, Wing On turned
into a loss from 199 1. According to Horne (1992) , Wing On's link-up with Seiyu “ took its
to11 on the Hong Kong company' s profitability last year [1991] . It s latest profit figures include
a loss of $15 .6 mi11ion being its share of losses of associated companies, most of which is
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believed to be linked with Seiyu". An other analyst , Dai (1993) commented that Wing On's
investment in joint venture projects in Seiyu (Shatin) Department Stores and the Mujirushi
Ryohin has not only led to lower profitability but also incurred losses.

According to Karl

Kwok , the high operating-cost environment had affected the business ofWing On Department
Stores. Angela Chan , the chairman of the Board of Directors WOIH , reiterated that operating
profit decreased owing to the high operating cost environment in Hong Kong .

She

commented that Mujirushi Ryohin chains of shops , in its development phase, “had no
significant impact on Group resu 1t s. The Seiyu (Shatin) Department Store . . . continues to
suffer from the same pressure which affect our department store business in Hong Kong"
(An nual Report 1992a, p.6). Nevertheless, the IJVs of Seiyu (Shatin) Department Stores and

Mujirushi Ryohin have gradually picked up their business during these four years which put
less pressure on the Group resu 1ts. The major pressure on the Group resu 1t is the economic
downturn of Hong Kong since the mid-1995 which is affecting Wing On' s performance and
profitability (personal communication, 1996)

Potential Problems

It appears that the joint ventures have run into some problems.

Some scholars

commented that international joint venture are bounded to have many problems owing to the
cross-cultural differences (Brown , Rugman and Verbeke , 1988; Young , Hamil , Wheeler and
Davies , 1989). Furthermore, Pucik (1992 , p.245) argued ,“ In a competitive collaboration, the
strategic intent of achieving dominance makes the long term wi nJwin outcome highly unlikely
in the partnership". In addition , a

m句 or

factor here is to understand the competition. When

these two companies invest in the two projects in Seiyu (Shatin) Department Store and Muji
Stores , they have better to access their local competitive positions , obtain a consensus in
company commitment, maintain competitive initiative, focus resources on their competitive
advantage , monitor strategies and change the strategies as the business evolves
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Conclusion

The collaboration between Wing On and Seiyu may appear to be a double-edged
sword , capable of both aiding and injuring Wing On. The injuring effect occurs when Wing On
incurred a loss in the last four years of the joint venture with Seiyu. However , a

success臼1

joint

venture requires a continuous and ongoing effort and negotiation by both partners. As Geringer

(1 988, p.187) pointed out,“unanticipated changes in the internal and external environment will
occur . . . strict reliance on the initially negotiated contract may produce less than satisfactory
performance . . . unless modifications are implemented." This may help solve the problem of the
pa口ner

who feels victimised by disparate outcomes. Since a balanced perception of both partner

in the joint venture is essential to the maintenance of trust and harmonious relationship. 1n other
words , continuous efforts are required from both Wing On and Seiyu in order to maintain a
viable international joint venture.
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